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ABSTRACT
Recent work in the domain of misinformation detection has lever-
aged rich signals in the text and user identities associated with
content on social media. But text can be strategically manipulated
and accounts reopened under different aliases, suggesting that these
approaches are inherently brittle. In this work, we investigate an
alternative modality that is naturally robust: the pattern in which
information propagates. Can the veracity of an unverified rumor
spreading online be discerned solely on the basis of its pattern of
diffusion through the social network?
Using graph kernels to extract complex topological informa-
tion from Twitter cascade structures, we train accurate predictive
models that are blind to language, user identities, and time, demon-
strating for the first time that such “sanitized” diffusion patterns
are highly informative of veracity. Our results indicate that, with
proper aggregation, the collective sharing pattern of the crowd may
reveal powerful signals of rumor truth or falsehood, even in the
early stages of propagation.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Computing methodologies→ Supervised learning by clas-
sification; Kernel methods; • Information systems→ Social net-
works; Blogs.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Social media has become the world’s dominant vector for infor-
mation propagation. Over three billion people use social media
platforms such as Twitter and Facebook, and more than two thirds
of Americans consume their news primarily through social media
[10, 25]. As social discourse, business, and even government are
increasingly conducted on social media platforms, understanding
how information travels through online networks is key to the
study of the future of the Web.
When considering the dynamics of information propagation on
social media, two factors are most salient: what is being shared and
how. The former relates to content –What is being discussed? By
whom, and in association with which emotions? Is the information
reliable? – while the latter refers to the spatiotemporal patterns that
the information being shared induces on the online social network.
The dynamics of these patterns are complex: the path that in-
formation takes on social media depends on the aggregation of
many individual decisions to share a piece of content. But each
decision distills the user’s personality, behavior, and emotional re-
sponse as they relate to a simple binary choice—whether to share
the information or not.
In this work, we ask whether the pattern in which information
spreads is indicative of its content. In particular, we consider the
following question: if we observe only how information propagates,
what can we infer about what is being propagated? We take a
machine learning approach to this problem, and in order to establish
that information dispersion is indicative of information content,
build predictive models of content from patterns of propagation.
Of course, the relationship between content and propagation
pattern can be quite simple. Individuals receiving a wedding invita-
tion from a couple are unlikely to forward it further, resulting in a
star-shaped path of information with the betrothed at the center. In
contrast, consider the spread of a secret. If each party to the secret
shares it with a single confidant, the pattern of propagation will
resemble a chain. Accordingly, training a classifier to determine
whether an information propagation pattern is associated with
an invitation or a secret would be easy. The associated cascades
would differ considerably under simple graph measures, such as
size, breadth, depth, and branching factor. Other content types,
however, may not be so distinct in their patterns of diffusion (see
Figure 1).
We hypothesize that more opaque aspects of content can be
accurately predicted from diffusion patterns alone. In this paper,
we test this theory on the task of predicting rumor veracity from
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Twitter propagation patterns, also known as cascades. Crucially,
we restrict the information available to completely exclude any
textual, temporal, or user-identifying data, leaving behind only the
anonymous topology of the propagation patterns of rumors through
Twitter. These patterns, modeled as simple directed graphs, reflect
the collective behavior of users engaging with and differentially
sharing rumors, and quite likely acting without verified knowledge
of their truthfulness. We refer to these carefully curated cascades
as sanitized cascades and discuss their preparation in detail.
Our hypothesis that rumor veracity can be inferred from cas-
cade topology arises from three observations from the literature.
First, individual users react differently to true and false content
[20]. Second, the collective opinions and actions of users can be
aggregated to produce accurate forecasts, for example in prediction
markets [5]. Third, in expectation, cascades surrounding true and
false content differ in their patterns of propagation [29].
Our results show that by combining appropriate representations
of cascades and their substructures with careful aggregation of the
collective behavior of users, it is possible to discern rumor veracity,
whereas simple metrics that capture global properties of cascades
are too coarse to be useful.
We choose the domain of sanitized rumor cascades on Twit-
ter because success therein evinces two particularly interesting
conclusions.
First, evidence that rumor veracity can be predicted from diffu-
sion patterns on Twitter suggests a surprising social interpretation:
although users spreading a rumor are likely unaware of its veracity
at the time of sharing, the emergent, collective signal arising from
the diffusion structure of the rumor through a crowd can, with
proper aggregation, be informative of veracity.
What makes the example of wedding invitation and secrets prop-
agation uninteresting to study is that participating users are aware
of the operative characteristic of the content and can adjust their
behavior accordingly. In establishing that diffusion patterns on
Twitter are informative of veracity even when users are locally
uncertain, we demonstrate how, with proper aggregation, weak
individual signals can be combined to produce useful predictions.
One of the unique contributions of our work is that we learn this
aggregation from data.
Second, mitigating the spread of misinformation on social media
is key to building a saferWeb. To this end, validating our hypothesis
on this task involves demonstrating a method for predicting a
rumor’s veracity from its diffusion pattern. Such a method seems
likely to be more robust to interference by malicious producers
of false content than does a model that relies on access to the
content itself or to user identities associated with the rumor.While a
single individual can fool content-based models by perturbing some
text or whitewashing their identity, attacking a model that takes
sanitized cascades as input requires changing the network topology,
an undertaking that inherently demands concerted malicious action
that spans many target users.
Our work draws on the same carefully curated data set as that
used in Vosoughi et al. [29]. One of the key findings of that study
is that false rumors, on average, spread deeper and faster through
a social network. While their work provides valuable descriptive
information, it reveals little about the predictive power of these
statistical attributes with respect to rumor veracity. Moreover, in the
Figure 1: One of networks A and B describes how a wedding
invitation propagates, while the other depicts the spread of
a secret. Determining which is which is an easy task. In con-
trast, networks C and D both describe the spread of a rumor,
one true and the other false. Can you guess which is which?
In this paper we show that the truth or falsehood of rumors
can be predicted just by observing their patterns of diffusion,
without access to textual content or user identities, and be-
fore their veracity is public knowledge.
present paper we show that baseline models constructed to consider
the statistics they extract—and show to be statistically significantly
different, conditioned on rumor veracity—are not successful in
predicting veracity.
While true and false rumors induce measurably different cas-
cades, these disparities are not useful when trying to discrimi-
nate between information and misinformation. In light of this, we
develop a model that extracts complex topological features from
anonymous rumor cascades to make accurate predictions about ve-
racity. In particular, we make use of graph kernels, wherein graphs
are embedded in a vector space, with dimensions corresponding to
attributes of motif-like substructures [18]. Here, a single Twitter
rumor cascade is represented as a graph that the kernel maps to a
point in the embedding space.
We introduce an efficient implementation of theWeisfeiler-Lehman
graph kernel [26] and use it to derive a topologically rich repre-
sentation of rumor cascades on Twitter. Embedded cascades are
then forwarded to a classifier that learns a relation between the
embedding space and a binary label, namely rumor veracity. Ulti-
mately, this technique embodies a model that can make accurate
predictions about the veracity of a rumor solely on the basis of its
sanitized cascade.
Before proceeding, it is important to stress what this work does
not intend to contribute. The model that we propose does not intend
to monitor or detect fake news or to outperform benchmarks on
misinformation classification. Methods for those tasks should be
designed to utilize every data source available, including the rich
content-based features that others have shown convincingly to be
predictive of veracity— the very same information that we remove
via sanitization. Indeed, this work does not even necessarily concern
fake news: we study rumors, and more specifically, rumors that
have been determined to be worthy of investigation and publication
by fact-checking websites.
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Fundamentally, this paper explores an unstudied modality of
prediction in which only the broad pattern of information diffusion
is available to a model.
1.1 Related Work
Despite the relatively recent rise of fake news as a cultural fixture,
there has long been academic interest in the propagation of true
and false information through social media networks. Friggeri et al.
[6] describe the ways in which rumors spread on Facebook, finding
that trust relationships play an important role. Zhou et al. [36]
describe theoretical properties of rumor propagation, while Bakshy
et al. [1] model information propagation and virality using field
experiments to determine whether strong or weak ties between
users are more responsible for the diffusion of novel information.
Gabielkov et al. [7] report results on Twitter in particular, studying
different types of retweet cascade patterns. And Coletto et al. [4]
use graph motifs to model rumor controversy but stop short of
predicting veracity.
There have also been several methods proposed to predict in-
formation veracity on social media platforms, but these have a
different goal in mind, and are intentionally designed to make use
of content—linguistic, user-based, or image data —in their input.
Castillo et al. [3], Liu et al. [13], Ma et al. [15], Sampson et al. [24],
and Tacchini et al. [27] each use statistical models of article and
tweet text, sometimes enriched with detailed user histories, to clas-
sify rumors after the fact as true or false; see also Zhou and Zafarani
[37] for a literature review of linguistic features studied for their
predictiveness of disinformative content.
Deep learning approaches include Yu et al. [35], Ruchansky et al.
[23], Liu and Wu [14], and Ma et al. [16], who combine linguistic
features with news website data, user profile data, or the conver-
sational stance of the content, using convolutional and recurrent
neural networks to achieve good predictive performance on datasets
from Twitter and its Chinese analog Weibo. Khattar et al. [11] inte-
grate methods from computer vision to predict veracity on the basis
of images and language. Yang et al. [34] develop the XFake system
for making and explaining predictions about news veracity, and Ma
et al. [17] propose an adversarial system based on textual content
to disrupt the propagation of rumors, especially as enhanced by
social network bots.
Some approaches combine content-based data with structural
information about cascades. Wu and Liu [32] propose a neural
model that predicts rumor veracity based on cascade structure,
but demands both user-identifying and temporal information as
input. Kwon et al. [12] develop a model that considers complex
descriptive statistics about rumor cascades, but at the same time
also requires knowledge of user-identifying follower relationships
and performs roughly as good as chance even a week after a rumor
is first published.
The above research is only tangential to the present paper, as
we purposefully focus only on topological information, and look to
explore whether this in and of itself can be predictive of veracity.
Moreover, it is expressly not our intention to develop a fake news
detector. Instead, we are motivated to explore a novel hypothesis as
to whether rumor veracity can be inferred from sanitized cascade
data alone, these cascades evolving before a fact checking event.
The study that is most related to our research is that of Vosoughi
et al. [29], which characterizes the differential diffusion of true and
false rumors through Twitter. Indeed, in this work we perform anal-
ysis on the same dataset. However, while they provide a descriptive
study of rumor cascades and study metrics that differ significantly
between true and false cascades, we show that these same metrics
cannot be used to predict the veracity of a rumor. As far as we
know, ours is the first work to perform predictive analytics on this
important dataset, demonstrating that true and false rumors can be
successfully differentiated by the shapes of their sanitized cascades.
Graph kernels have been used for classification of networked
objects in fields such as computational biology [21] and chemistry
[26], but the literature on the use of graph kernels in social network
classification is relatively small. One study develops deep graph
kernels, which are graph kernel representations learned by neu-
ral networks, and applies them to predict Reddit sub-community
interactions [33]. Nikolentzos et al. [19] use a graph kernel based
on a convolutional neural network that performs well on a syn-
thetic dataset but has limited success on real-world social network
datasets. Finally, Wu et al. [31] predict rumor veracity on Weibo
using a graph kernel-based model, but their approach requires both
rich textual data and user profile information. Moreover, though
these studies involving graph kernels are methodologically rele-
vant, none of them makes a comparison, as we do, to a baseline
classifier that uses standard features extracted from the cascades.
2 METHOD
The task of interest in this work is to predict an attribute associated
with a rumor, namely its veracity, having access only to the cascade
that characterizes the rumor’s propagation. We begin with a formal
model of cascades and discuss how they can be curated from data.
We then describe a family of predictive models suited for our task.
2.1 Formal Setup
Let G = (V ,E) be a directed graph representing a social network
(e.g., the Twitter follower graph), whereV is the set of nodes and E
is the set of edges.
Our input data comprise cascades, objects describing the set of
nodes involved in a single process of information sharing. A cascade
c = (Vc ,Ec ) is a connected, rooted digraph whose edges emanate
outward from its root (otherwise known as an arborescence). Nodes
Vc ⊆ V indicate involved users (with the root of c corresponding to
the individual initiating the process), and Ec ⊆ E are edges through
which information flows.
Our data comprise cascades relating to rumors as they propa-
gate through the Twitter social graph. We denote by rc the rumor
associated with c . Hence, an edge (u,v) ∈ Ec indicates that v ∈ Vc
retweeted a (re)tweet from u ∈ Vc that is discussing rc .1 Each ru-
mor may have multiple cascades related to it, but each cascade
relates only to one rumor. This will be important in designing our
experimental evaluation scheme.
Each cascade c is associated with a ground-truth label y ∈ {0, 1},
describing the truthfulness— or veracity— of rc . Crucial to our study
1Note that because retweets are broadcast, and because the data include only retweets
(and not comments or likes), an edge (u, v) ∈ E appears in Ec only if both u and v
actively share the propagating content item.
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is that cascade c does not directly encode any information related to
rumor rc or ground truth y; c has no access to the language associ-
ated with rc , the user identities associated withVc , or the temporal
data associated with Ec . Any information about the content of ru-
mor rc or its ground truth label y can only be present, implicitly, in
the topology of c . We refer to these cascades as sanitized. Details
on the construction of such cascades are given in Section 3.1.1.
To establish that cascades are informative of rumorous content,
we seek to demonstrate that cascades are predictive of veracity.
Our task, then, is to learn a function f (c) mapping cascades c to
veracities y ∈ {0, 1}. We adopt the standard supervised learning
paradigm and assume there is an unknown joint distribution D
over cascades and labels, from which we observe a sample set
S = {(c j ,yj )}Nj=1 of N cascade-label pairs drawn i.i.d. from D. Our
learning objective is to train a classifier f ∈ F , from some function
class F , achieving high expected accuracy:
E(c,y)∼D [1{ f (c) = y}] = P(c,y)∼D (f (c) = y) (1)
which we achieve by minimizing an appropriate empirical loss:
min
f ∈F
N∑
j=1
L(yj , f (c j )) (2)
where L(y, yˆ) is a loss function (e.g., the 0/1 loss, or some continuous
proxy thereof) and possibly using some form of regularization.
In the experiments we consider and evaluate several methods
for classification, each inducing a different function class F .
2.2 Graph Kernels
Our main approach to predicting veracity from cascades uses graph
kernels, specifically an embodiment of the Weisfeiler-Lehman (WL)
graph kernel [26].
Graph kernels are functions that compute inner products be-
tween vector representations of graphs. One way to define a graph
kernel is through its induced vector representation.2 Letting Ω be
the set of cascades andH be a reproducing Hilbert space, consider
a mapping ϕ : Ω → H . A graph kernel k : Ω × Ω → R is a func-
tion that first maps each graph into an embedded vector space via
the mapping ϕ, and then computes an inner product within the
embedded space:
k(c, c ′) = ⟨ϕ(c),ϕ(c ′)⟩H (3)
That is, for a cascade pair (c, c ′), the kernel value is equal to their
Hilbert-space inner product.
Hence, a graph kernel defines a similarity metric between two
graphs, where similarity is measured in the embedded space; the
larger the value of k(c, c ′), the more similar c and c ′. Different
kernels induce different similarity metrics depending on the graph
representations they consider. Most graph kernels are based on an
enumeration of certain graph substructures (e.g., paths, subgraphs,
and randomwalks), giving topologically rich (albeit combinatorially
large) representations that capture intricate structural properties
of graphs.
2Graph kernels apply to graphs in general, but for consistency, we describe them in
the context of cascades.
Graph kernels lie at the heart of many machine learning meth-
ods, as they offer an expressive alternative to standard feature-
engineered approaches; rather than relying on handcrafted features
relating to specific narrow properties, graph kernels take the full
shape of a graph into account, incorporating both local and global
information. Due to the prohibitive size of representations, many
methods handle features implicitly by working directly with ker-
nel values k(c, c ′). Fortunately, due to our setting and the graph
kernels we select, the graph representations induced by the kernel
are sparse (i.e., each ϕ(c) has relatively few non-zero entries). With
proper consideration in implementation, then, these representa-
tions can be computed explicitly. This allows us to work directly
with the graph embedding ϕ and consider any machine learning
model that admits a sparse vector input (e.g., linear and tree-based
models).
The literature on learning with graph inputs describes three
overarching categories of graph kernels: random-walk kernels,
shortest-paths kernels, and subtree kernels. Since our data consists
of cascades (in the form of arborescences), and since cascades of
real-world sharing patterns tend to be shallow (the median longest
path across our cascades is four), kernels based on random walks
and shortest paths are unlikely to offer sufficiently expressive rep-
resentations of our inputs. Thus, we choose to focus on subtree
methods, hypothesizing that these are particularly well-suited for
capturing useful substructures of rumor cascades on social net-
works. In particular, our approach leverages the Weisfeiler-Lehman
(WL) kernel [26], which we describe in detail next.
2.3 The Weisfeiler-Lehman Kernel
The WL kernel is a subtree-based approach that measures the sim-
ilarity of labeled graphs by iteratively comparing common node
substructures, merging nodes by edge, and then comparing again.
It derives its name and underlying technique from the Weisfeiler-
Lehman test of isomorphism between graphs [30], which it applies
sequentially to compute a metric for how close to (or far from)
isomorphism two graphs are.
While the full WL procedure requires iterating until conver-
gence, in practice it is often useful to consider only a finite and
predetermined number of iterations h, since this provides a means
for controlling the size of the feature representation ϕ. One in-
terpretation of the graph embedding ϕ induced by WL is that it
represents a graph as a bag of motifs, similarly to how text can be
represented as a bag of words (indeed, our experiments show that
methods known to work well for sparse text also work well for WL
graph representations). Thus, each dimension of ϕ(c) corresponds
to a motif, and the entire vector ϕ(c) describes the collection (i.e.,
counts) of motifs in the input graph. The larger h, the larger and
more complex motifs ϕ includes: for small h, the kernel measures
similarity with respect to simple motifs, while for large h, similarity
regards deeper, wider, and more elaborate substructures.
A useful property of theWL kernel is that it can incorporate node
attributes, which we refer to as node tags. These can be cascade-
specific (i.e., the same v ∈ V can be tagged differently in Vc and
Vc ′ ), and parameterized by tagging functions ℓc : Vc → Σ, where
Σ is a finite set of attribute values. Importantly, to remain within
our sanitized setting, all tags will be derived either from the graph
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G (e.g., node in-degree) or from the cascade c (e.g., node depth),
and not from any additional information external to the graph.
Furthermore, to prevent tags from inadvertently expressing node
identities, we use only coarse tags, where node properties (e.g., in-
degree) are binned (typically logarithmically) into a small number
of buckets. Tags are useful in improving predictive performance.
For the remainder of the paper and when clear from context, we
will overload notation and assume c also encodes node tags as
determined by ℓc .
2.3.1 Computing WL Representations. We now describe the proce-
dure for computing WL features for a given cascade c [30].
The input consists of c , a tag-labeling function ℓ, and a choice of
the number of iterations h.
We proceed by iteration, with each indexed by i . Iteration i
associates a tag τi (v) ∈ Σ and a multiset of stringsMi (v) for each
vertex v ∈ V , where τ0(v) is set initially to ℓ(v).
In iteration i , we setMi (v) = {τi−1(v ′)|v ′ ∈ N(v)}, where N(v)
denotes the set of neighbors of v .
For each v , we sort and concatenate the stringsMi (v) to obtain
si (v). Next, we prefix si (v) with τi−1(v), the tag from the previous
iteration, such that si (v) := τi−1 | |si (v), where | | is the concatenation
operator. Last, we compress the new si (v) by encoding it with a hash
function H : Σ∗ → Σ, stipulating that H (si (v)) = H (si (w)) ⇐⇒
si (v) = si (w) (i.e., H is a perfect hash function.3). We set τi (v) =
H (si (v)) for all v .
At each iteration i , the tag τi (v) of a node is thus a distinctive
encoding of a sequence of merges of tags from its neighbors. At
iteration i , the tag for a node depends on information about vertices
that are i edges removed from the node. At the end of h iterations,
we compute #i (c,σi j ), which is a count of the number of times
the tag σi j ∈ Σ occurs in the tags of c at iteration i . Formally,
let the set of tags associated with the vertices of c at iteration i
be Σi = {τi (v)|v ∈ V }. Assume without loss of generality that
Σi = {σi0, . . . ,σi |Σi |} is lexically sorted. Then the mapping
#i : Ω × Σ → N represents the number of times that the tag σi j
occurs in Σi . Applied to c and each tag in Σ, #i induces a vector
corresponding to the topological features of c:
ϕ(c) = (#0(c,σ00), . . . ,#0(c,σ0 |Σ1 |), . . . ,
#h (c,σh0), . . . , #h (c,σh |Σh |)) (4)
That is, ϕ(c) is the concatenated values of the counts for each tag
at each iteration, providing a topologically rich embedding of c .
2.3.2 Runtime Analysis. Let m = |Ec | and n = |Vc |, noting that
m ≥ n. For one iteration of the WL kernel, each node receives
and sorts its neighbors’ tags. Because the list of all tags is finite
and known, bucket sort can be used to order each node’s multiset
of neighbors’ tags. There are n buckets, one for each tag, andm
elements to sort, i.e., one tag passed along each edge. The sorting
time is thus O(n +m). The time to run h iterations of the kernel is
thus O(h(n +m)) = O(hm).
3While this is theoretically impossible due to the pigeonhole principle, it is an easy
condition for modern 32- or 64-bit computers to guarantee with near certainty. Indeed,
our implementation simply hashes character string labels to an integer.
Figure 2: An illustration of the WL procedure. The cascade
above is described as a collection of its sub-components,
which each correspond to an entry in the feature vector ϕ.
Color represents tags τ ∈ {red, blue}, which are taken into
account in the construction of ϕ. Boxes contain features ob-
tained at iterations h ∈ {0, 1, 2} of the WL procedure .
3 EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we present our experimental results in support of
the hypothesis that patterns of information propagation can be
informative of content. The experiments consider the problem of
rumor veracity classification, where given a sanitized cascade of
an unresolved rumor, the task is to predict if the rumor would
eventually turn out to be true or false.
3.1 Data
We evaluate our approach on use the dataset curated and studied
by Vosoughi et al. [29],4 which includes Twitter retweet cascades
linked to rumors that were verified and published by fact-checking
websites. Our main consideration in choosing a dataset was ensur-
ing it could serve as a credible testbed for evaluating our hypothesis.
The Vosoughi et al. [29] dataset exhibits several unique characteris-
tics, discussed below, that were crucial for our evaluation procedure.
3.1.1 Data Collection and Processing. We begin by summarizing
the process that Vosoughi et al. [29] undertook to collect veracity-
labeled rumor cascades. Granted access to the full Twitter historical
archive, they began by searching for any tweet whose replies in-
clude a link to a fact-checking article from one of six websites.5
They confirmed that the text of the fact-checking article was related
to the content of the tweet by embedding both in a vector space
and measuring their cosine similarity. They then collected all the
retweets of the rumor, building the full cascade while discarding
tweets that may have referenced the fact-checking article or were
4We note two considerations with respect to our use of this data. First, the data that we
study are completely anonymous and only contain a few non-identifying user-related
attributes per node, and our work was done under approval of the Harvard University
Institutional Review Board. Second, the dataset was provided to us with permission
from Twitter, with whom we are not affiliated. Researchers interested in gaining access
to the data should contact either Vosoughi et al. [29] or Twitter directly.
5These websites are snopes.com, politifact.com, factcheck.org, truthorfiction.com,
hoax-slayer.com, and urbanlegends.about.com
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determined by a bot-detection algorithm [28] to have been written
automatically. Last, they applied a method known as time-inferred
diffusion [8] to reconstruct implied retweet edges by consulting the
full Twitter follower graph, an index of the relationships among
all Twitter users that is not made available to the public. The la-
bel of each cascade, i.e., a binary value y reflecting whether the
rumor turned out to be true or false, was set in accordance with the
veracity of the cascade as revealed by the relevant fact-checking
organization.
Critically, Vosoughi et al. [29] undertake rigorous postprocessing
steps to ensure that all events in each cascade precede the publi-
cation of the corresponding fact-checking article. The curation
process results in a collection of veracity-labeled rumor cascades
whose participating users are likely unaware of any publicly avail-
able resolution regarding the veracity of the rumor at their time of
sharing. This supposition is further strengthened by the inclination
of fact-checking websites to target and publish results on nontrivial
rumors whose resolution requires time and effort. Additionally,
since the dataset was constructed from the full Twitter archive,
cascades are fully representative of Twitter user dynamics and do
not suffer from issues of partiality or bias due to sampling restric-
tions characteristic of most other Twitter datasets. To the best of
our knowledge, the Vosoughi et al. [29] dataset is unique in hav-
ing these properties. For further details, we refer the reader to the
supplementary material in their work.
Note that due to the retweet mechanics of Twitter and to the
nature of our dataset, cascades represent only partial observations.
Specifically, while we can observe a post (a tweet or retweet) by
a user, we cannot know which of their followers saw but did not
retweet that post. This means that leaf nodes in the cascades repre-
sent users who posted some content but whose followers did not
retweet that same content within the observed time period.
3.1.2 Data Characteristics. In total, the full dataset contains about
126,000 cascades comprising over 4.5 million tweets. Both cascade
size and depth distributions are heavy-tailed, as is typical in such
data. To avoid trivial cascades, in our experiments we only consider
cascades of size 25 or more nodes, which account for 4% of all
instances. Overall, we experiment on 5,066 cascades. Label classes
are imbalanced, with true rumors accounting for only 21% of all
rumors and 14% of all cascades. Our choice of evaluation metrics
and optimization approaches, described later, account for this.
The cascades used in our experiments are sanitized in three im-
portant ways. First, they do not include any textual information
(this is not available in the dataset). Second, they do not convey any
notion of time (retweet time signatures are available in the data,
but we discard them). Third, they do not reveal any user identities.
While the original data are anonymous, users could still in principle
be linked across cascades through other identifiers (e.g., the unique
degree of a popular node). However, our use of log-scaled bins for
node tags ensures that any inferred attribute is shared by many
nodes, making individual identification extremely unlikely. More-
over, the variance in retweeting patterns across cascades provides
a natural “masking” of local neighborhoods, making linkage across
cascades via graph isomorphism techniques essentially infeasible.
3.1.3 Limitations. Aswith any data collection procedure, the dataset
used by Vosoughi et al. [29] presents certain limitations that are
important when considering conclusions and implications of our
results.
First, the dataset includes only rumors that were deemed worthy
of investigation and publication by fact checking websites, and
only cascades that directly referenced those published results were
associated with a rumor. Hence, the data does not consider all cas-
cades emanating from a specific rumor, the entire population of
potentially-rumorous cascades, or the general set of all Twitter
cascades. Misinformation is notoriously difficult to define, making
its collection and labeling challenging and susceptible to misin-
terpretation or criticism. The approach taken by Vosoughi et al.
[29], and which we adopt herein, is to appeal to third-parties, such
as fact-checking organizations that effectively define and label a
particular type of misinformation, namely online rumors. While
this may introduce a measure of selection bias, it is hard to imagine
a way to collect potentially misinformative content that does not
introduce some bias. Nonetheless, to further validate their results,
Vosoughi et al. [29] repeated their experiments with rumors identi-
fied and labeled by independent labelers (that were not considered
by fact-checking websites), finding that their results held.
We further note that content that has been targeted, researched,
and published by fact-checking websites likely consists of interest-
ing content useful for evaluating our method.
Second, despite the extensive efforts of Vosoughi et al. [29] to
control for possible confounding factors, information regarding
content can still leak into cascades, (e.g., from external sources
of information), which is impossible to mitigate fully. However,
the successful replication of their findings on the set of rumors
identified and labeled independently provides evidence against
such confounding influence.
Third, the dataset cannot (and should not) be considered a col-
lection of fake news. Fake news is a term that disregards important
factors such as malintention, publication medium, and the potential
for news to have mixed veracity. It does not distinguish between
maliciously false news and satire, it cannot be objectively identified,
and its evolution in the public vernacular has resulted in its use by
some politicians as a catchall for opposing positions or unflattering
portrayals. This noted, clearly there is a connection between the
spread of rumors and the phenomenon of fake news, and our results
should be relevant to research in this domain.
While the dataset serves our purpose of determining veracity
based on patterns, it is not ideal for evaluating the usefulness of pre-
dictive methods as real-time classification methods, while rumors
spread. This is because these data are collected after the fact, when
the veracity of the rumor has already been ascertained and publicly
announced. What we are able to do is to simulate a real-time set-
ting by truncating cascades by time and investigate how early in a
rumor’s diffusion our method can accurately classify veracity. Our
results in this setting, described in Section 3.4.1, are encouraging.
Finally, we note that the above issues are intrinsic properties
of the domain of rumor propagation in social networks. To the
best of our knowledge, the dataset that we use is the best currently
available source of data on this topic.
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3.2 Experimental Setup
We focus on cascades composed of at least 600 nodes, a number
chosen to strike a balance between having sufficiently rich cascades
and enough examples to learn a robust classifier (see later discussion
in Section 3.3.1). For our method based on WL kernels, we consider
four variants, differing in predictive models and types of tags used.
The predictive models include a linear model and a nonlinear model,
while tags are based on either the cascade or the underlying Twitter
follower graph. We refer to these methods as WL-lin-c, WL-lin-
g, WL-nonlin-c, andWL-nonlin-g, and use the termsWL methods
(or simply WL when clear from context) to refer to any or all of
them. For the linear model, we use logistic regression with L2
regularization. For the nonlinear model, we use gradient-boosted
trees (using the LightGBM package [9]), which are known to be
especially performant when applied to sparse representations such
as those of the WL kernel.
For node tags, we use the out-degree value: for cascade-based
models, these are computed with respect to the cascade, and the
graph-based models, they are computed with respect to the un-
derlying Twitter follower graph.6 Note that the outgoing edges
in the former are an instance-dependent subset of the outgoing
edges in the latter. As discussed in Section 2.3, rather than assign-
ing actual degree values to nodes, we assign node tags based on
the logarithmically-scaled bin a node’s out-degree falls into. We
bin values both to reduce the effective dimensionality of the fea-
ture representation and to mitigate the possibility of inadvertently
identifying users on the basis of unique degree values.
To prevent label information from leaking across cascades, we
execute a train-test split that is stratified by rumor. That is, if a
rumor is associated with several cascades, those cascades will all
be in either the train or test set. To account for the class imbalance
in our dataset, in all experiments we report the F1 score as a metric
of predictive performance. We repeat each experiment 100 times
with different random seeds and report mean results across trials.
Tuning across regularization constants, penalty functions, and
any other hyperparameters for all models was done using 5-fold
rumor-stratified cross validation on the training set. The parameter
space was explored by Bayesian optimization.
3.2.1 Baselines. One of the central contentions of this work is
that standard graph metrics, even if known to differ significantly
between true and false rumor cascades, do not hold sufficient predic-
tive power to accurately discern veracity. In contrast, theWL kernel,
which represents a cascade as a large collection of its substructures,
offers a data-driven approach to determining which aspects of cas-
cade topology are important for predictive accuracy. To test this
claim, we employ baseline models that use cascade attributes shown
to correlate strongly with veracity [29] and graph metrics used suc-
cessfully in other cascade classification tasks [22]. We compare the
predictive power of these baselines to that of the WL methods such
that the difference in performance, if any, provides quantitative
evidence as to the utility of the WL representation.
Overall, for each cascade we compute 32 handcrafted baseline
graph attributes. Simple cascade attributes include size, density,
depth, width, number of leaf nodes, and out-degree of the root node.
6The dataset provides only in- and out-degree counts for each node. It does not provide
direct access to the Twitter follower graph.
We include several summary statistics for degree and centrality
distributions, as well as assortativity values. We complement these
with attributes describing non-topological aspects of the cascade:
the number of nodes retweeting within one day and within one
week of the root tweet, and the structural virality of the cascade
[29].
We use these attributes in two ways: individually and as input
to supervised classifiers.
The purpose of the individual attribute baselines is to demon-
strate the low predictive power inherent to these attributes, despite
their established correlation with veracity [29]. For a given attribute,
predictions are generated by first learning from a training set a
threshold that maximizes F1 score, then predicting as false any
cascade whose attribute value is below the threshold. We report at-
tribute baselines for cascade size, depth, maximal width, root degree,
number of leaves, number of tweets after one day, number of tweets
after one week, median followers, and median followees.7
We then combine these individual attributes into vector inputs
for trained classifier models. These stronger baselines aim to quan-
tify the added predictive power afforded to a model by the WL
kernel. Therefore, we use the same kinds of classifiers as in the
WL methods, namely logistic regression (features-lin) and gradient-
boosted trees (features-nonlin).
For completeness, we also compute a no-information baseline (no
info), which we define as the highest-achievable F1 score when no
input information is available (akin to comparing to chance when
evaluating with respect to accuracy). If cascades are uninformative
of content, all predictive models given cascades as input would
perform as well as or worse than the no info baseline. However, if
cascades are informative, then a model’s outperformance of no info
provides insight into the degree of their informativeness.
We select baselines conducive to an appropriate experimental
environment for testing our hypothesis. We choose not to include
baselines that draw on more recent approaches such as deep graph
networks (e.g., Yanardag and Vishwanathan [33]) for three reasons.
First, such deep methods tend to require vast amounts of labeled
data, while the number of cascades in our dataset is small by those
standards. Second, there is increasing evidence that such methods
lack robustness [38], which does not align well with part of the mo-
tivation for this work. Third, and most importantly, this work seeks
to test a hypothesis, not achieve state-of-the-art predictive perfor-
mance. To this end, it suffices to demonstrate that some suitable
predictive method over sanitized cascades is sufficiently accurate.
As we show, we are able to validate our hypothesis with our chosen
kernalized approach.
Finally, we note that an ideal set of baselines would include
methods that consider content (e.g., retweet text) or user identities.
Unfortunately, the dataset does includes neither text nor any kind
of user identifiers, making such comparisons impossible.
3.3 Experimental Results
We now present our main results for predicting rumor veracity
from sanitized cascades (Figure 3). We begin with methods that use
7Though our WL methods use tags based on binned out-degree, our attribute baselines
consider the unbinned median number of followers and followees of users involved in
the cascade. Note that here an unbinned attribute baseline is a weakly better model
than a binned attribute baseline.
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Figure 3: Predicting the veracity of online rumors based on sanitized Twitter cascades. Single attribute baselines (attributes)
and graph feature-based linear (features-lin) and nonlinear (features-nonlin) classifiers perform on par with (or worse than)
a no-information (no info) baseline (i.e., a random Bernoulli predictor parameterized with the optimal class balance). WL
methods significantly outperform all baselines and perform exceptionally well when nodes are tagged with their log-binned
follower graph out-degree counts, with the nonlinear WL model (WL-nonlin-g) achieving F1 = 0.77, improving over the no-
information baseline by a factor of 4.81.
information available only in sanitized cascades. The results show
that simple attributes of a cascade (attributes) are not powerful pre-
dictors. In fact, the F1 scores associated with these attribute-based
baselines are similar to the score of the no-information baseline (no
info) with F1 = 0.16, suggesting that these models are incapable
of extracting from cascades information that is relevant to their
veracity. Graph feature-based baseline classifiers (features-lin and
features-nonlin) do not fare much better, regardless of the under-
lying predictive model. Meanwhile, graph kernels methods with
cascade-based tags (WL-lin-c andWL-nonlin-c) achieve F1 scores
significantly higher than the no-information baseline, suggesting
that they are able to discover veracity signals from sanitized cas-
cades alone.
While demonstrating informativeness, the predictive power of
cascade-only WL methods remains fairly low, with F1 = 0.25 for
WL-lin-c and F1 = 0.27 forWL-nonlin-c.
However, the WL scores improve dramatically when node tags
correspond to log-binned follower graph out-degrees, known on
Twitter as the number of followees. The single attribute baselines
suggest that when considered alone, information drawn from the
follower graph (such as the number of followers and followees) pro-
vides limited predictive power. ButWLmethods are able to leverage
such signals in the context of the cascade’s broader topology to
produce surprisingly accurate predictions, achieving F1 = 0.68 for
WL-lin-g and F1 = 0.77 forWL-nonlin-g. Hence, injecting into the
rich WL structural cascade representation a small amount of anony-
mous, content-blind, and very coarse local graph-based information
results in accuracy that outperforms the no-information baseline
by factors of 4.25 and 4.81 for the linear and nonlinear models,
respectively.
This result embodies our most important finding, that cascade
topology is indeed informative of rumor veracity. Next, we analyze
the predictive properties of graph kernels, investigating their perfor-
mance under two different experimental conditions and revealing
interesting tradeoffs.
3.3.1 Varying Minimum Cascade Size. In the first experimental
condition, we evaluate the performance of graph kernel methods
on cascades of varying sizes (by number of nodes). Specifically,
for increasing values of size thresholdm, we test how well graph
kernel methods perform when restricted to cascades whose size is
at leastm.
Our goal in this experiment is motivated by practical concerns:
intriguing rumors are likely to be discussed more and therefore lead
to larger cascades. Hence, such large, socially impactful cascades are
of prime interest in terms of accurate prediction. Moreover, as they
contain more information, it is plausible that they are easier targets
for prediction than small cascades. Therefore, we may expect that
setting a high threshold value (thus including in the sample set
only large cascades) will improve performance.
On the other hand, large cascades are also considerably rarer
in our dataset, so increasing the threshold will result in smaller
training sets. As such, we might also expect performance to de-
grade with an increasing threshold. Here we explore this tradeoff
and ask whether filtering out smaller cascades improves overall
performance, and if so, to what degree.
Figure 4 (left) shows F1 scores for thresholdm ∈ {200, 300, . . . , 800},
as well as the number of samples for each threshold. As can be seen,
performance across thresholds reveals a pattern of poor perfor-
mance at extreme values ofm; setting the threshold too low leads
to many non-informative cascades, while setting it too high leads
to insufficiently few cascades in the training set. Based on this, we
select 600 as our canonical cutoff for all other experiments in which
we fix the minimal cascade size.
3.3.2 Varying WL Iterations. In our second experimental condi-
tion, we test the performance of the WL graph kernel method as
the number of WL iterations increases. Recall that at iteration h,
graph kernels represent each cascade by substructures that are
of depth at most h. Increasing the number of iterations has two
contrasting effects. On one hand, increasing iterations leads to a
representation of cascades that is more nuanced and informative.
Hence, performance could potentially improve. On the other, hav-
ing deeper substructures also means having more substructures. As
a result, the effective number of features per cascade increases, and
overfitting may cause performance to degrade.
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Figure 4: Performance of WL when varying cascade size
and number of WL iterations. Left: Performance of WL
on data with increasing minimal cascade size (i.e., number
of nodes). When the threshold increases, the data include
larger and hence more informative cascades, but the num-
ber of data points decreases. This results in an inverse U-
shaped curve. The nonlinear WL is more robust to a de-
crease in the number of large cascades. Right: Performance
of WL for an increasing number of WL iterations (h). As
the number of iterations increases, cascades representations
consider richer substructures. The nonlinear model utilizes
these expressive representations to improve predictive per-
formance. Meanwhile, the linear model is fairly insensitive
to the number of iterations, indicating that it is unable to
leverage higher-order graph substructures, and that model-
ing nonlinear interactions between topological features is
necessary for achieving good accuracy.
Figure 4 shows results for h ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}. The results reveal
a stark distinction between the linear and nonlinear models. For
the nonlinear model, more iterations are in general helpful and
contribute significantly to performance: the optimal score at h = 2
is 0.77, whereas for h = 0 (where substructures include only node-
type counts) it is 0.68. Mild overfitting can be observed starting
at h = 3, suggesting that performance could further increase with
access to larger datasets. For the linear model, the performance
curve is flat, indicating that the classifier is incapable of utilizing the
additional information available in higher-order structures. Taken
together, these results imply that educing predictive power from
higher-order substructures requires modeling their interactions.
3.4 Analysis
So far, we have considered the cascades in the data as static ar-
tifacts. In reality, cascades are dynamic objects that evolve over
time. One implication of the data collection process (see Section
3.1) is that each instance represents a cascade as it was observed
just before its rumor’s veracity was publicly disseminated. Hence,
the main experiment’s setup assumes the viewpoint adopted at
the peak of each cascade’s informativeness relative to what is in
the public domain. However, investigating whether cascades are
indicative of veracity also demands studying predictiveness when
the observations used to classify rumors are made earlier in the
development of a cascade. To this end, we consider two measures
of the progression of a cascade. The first is time locality, or the
Figure 5: Performance ofWLon cascades truncated by depth
and duration. Left: For depth, most of the increase in per-
formance occurs when considering all nodes at distance at
most two from the root (i.e., children and grandchildren).
Nonetheless, adding deeper nodes continues to improve per-
formance, an effect most salient in the nonlinear model.
Right: For duration, performance steadily increases as more
information accumulates over time. Further, both linear and
nonlinear WL models, when given data gathered up to only
one hour from the initial posting time, outperform all base-
lines given access to all of the data. By 24 hours, perfor-
mance of the nonlinear WL model reaches roughly 90% of
the score it achieves when trained on the full data.
duration from the original tweet, and the second is graph locality,
or the number of edges from the root node in the cascade.
3.4.1 Truncation by Time. The first variation simulates an early
detection scenario, where cascades are observed only a short time
after the initial tweet. For this, we instrument our dataset such
that each cascade is replaced by a time-truncated subgraph of the
cascade. A cascade truncated at a duration of t hours contains only
nodes of that cascade that correspond to retweets posted within t
hours of the root tweet. In this way, the truncation gives the cascade
that would have been observed had the measurement been taken t
hours after the root tweet.
Our goal here is twofold. Beyond simply understanding the re-
liability of the method at early stages in the propagation process,
demonstrating successful early prediction also alleviates possible
concerns of leakage with respect to any publicly disseminated sig-
nals about the veracity of a rumor. Leaf nodes of the cascade appear
on average 11 days after the root tweet. Hence, the earlier in a cas-
cade we can show that that the structure of diffusion is predictively
useful, the more unlikely it is that our models are learning from
topological signals that represent latent fact checking information.
Figure 5 presents results for a variety of different truncation
levels. Our findings show that, even within one hour of the original
tweet, the WL methods surpass all other baselines considered in
Section 3.2.1, even though these baselines are given the full, untrun-
cated cascades. Within 24 hours of the root tweet, the nonlinear
WL model achieves 89.4% of the performance without time-based
truncation, and within 72 hours it matches 91.6%. Truncating at
one hour and 24 hours results in cascade sets containing just 17%
and 57% of all nodes, respectively. These results demonstrate that
veracity signals can be captured early in the propagation process.
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3.4.2 Truncation By Depth. As a second kind of robustness check,
we truncate cascades by the distance of nodes from the root tweet.
That is, for some depth d , any node more than d edges from the
root is removed from the cascade. As before, this process results in
valid cascades that are pruned radially from the root. Our interest
here is to explore a setting in which the nodes in the neighborhood
of the root tweet may be considered trustworthy and part of an
established community. Perhaps these trustworthy root nodes are
naïvely sharing questionable content, while deeper nodes in the
cascade behave adversarially in accordance with an ulterior motive,
such as the spread of misinformation. Accurate prediction on cas-
cades that are restricted to small neighborhoods around the root
tweet would imply that malicious actors would need to find ways
to exercise influence from deep within established communities—
a much harder task.
Figure 5 presents results at different truncation depths. While the
largest increase in performance can be attributed to the inclusion
of the root’s grandchildren (i.e., depth one vs. depth two nodes),
the model’s performance continues to improve as deeper substruc-
tures are considered. Interestingly, these results also shed light
on which of the underlying graph substructures are important for
high accuracy. As cascades become deeper, the WL process collects
additional subgraph signatures, especially so when the number of
WL iterations is larger. Hence, the results suggest that features
extracted from complex motifs are crucial for properly aggregat-
ing the crowd’s signal. Note also that this is only apparent in the
nonlinear model. In the case of the linear model, adding depth does
not dramatically affect performance, a fact that aligns well with
our findings with respect to WL iterations (Figure 4). Hence, not
only are individual deep structures important, but so too are their
interactions, which are vital to the accurate prediction of veracity.
3.4.3 Interpretability. One of our motivations for including a linear
WL classifier was that, when trained with a sparsity-inducing regu-
larizer like LASSO, the model provides a framework for interpreta-
tion that could potentially shed light on the predictive importance
of individual features (i.e., cascade substructures or motifs). This,
however, proved to be challenging. As our results show, the linear
model is insensitive to the number of WL iterations (see Section
3.3.1). Further experiments with sparse linear models revealed two
related phenomena. First, training results in features selected in-
consistently (i.e., different random train-test splits produce models
with similar accuracy that rely on significantly divergent sets of
features). Second, in many cases the selected features correspond
to h = 0.
Furthermore, the superior performance of the nonlinear model
suggests that much of its predictive power stems from considering
interactions between features, making interpretation all the more
challenging. Hence, our analysis shows not only that linear models
provide little insight as to the predictive mechanics of graph kernels
on our task, but also that merely considering individual motifs,
rather than their interactions, is insufficient for good accuracy.
4 DISCUSSION
In this work, we consider whether network diffusion patterns are in-
formative of content. By building models that learn representations
of sanitized cascades, we show that strong predictive performance
of rumor veracity can be achieved without considering any textual
or user-identifying information. In particular, we demonstrate that
topologically rich encodings of cascades provide enough informa-
tion to predict veracity.
These experimental results support the hypothesis that aspects
of content, likely opaque even to individual participants, can be
accurately predicted from the collective signal of diffusion patterns.
At the same time, they also suggest that accurate prediction requires
careful consideration as to how cascades are represented.
In our work, we represent rumor cascades as collections of small,
high-fidelity graph substructures. The models that we train are able
to efficiently aggregate these motifs of communication flow for
prediction, and the method as a whole can be considered a flexible,
data-driven approach for eliciting the wisdom of the crowd with
respect to a rumor’s veracity. We choose to use structures derived
from the WL kernel, a powerful and general approach for embed-
ding graphs. We hope that future research will reveal additional
cascade representations that are both useful and interpretable.
We also observe that unlike content-based approaches that an-
alyze the authors, text, images, and metadata associated with in-
dividual tweets, the proposed model aggregates simple behavioral
signals of many individual users. We argue that this provides the
additional benefit of community robustness: for a malicious producer
of misinformation to succeed in fooling our topological models,
they must influence the actions of a large number of honest users.
The extent to which this sort of robustness can be demonstrated
empirically is limited by the data that are currently available to
the research community. While recent work has focused either on
the brittleness of content-based models [2] or the propensity of
graph-based predictors to thwart adversarial attacks [38], it does
not consider them jointly. Such research would be illuminating,
but to the best of our knowledge, there are no available datasets in
which both modalities are present. We hope that the results herein
encourage the curation and release of such data.
We conclude by noting that although our research may enrich
the body of work on the prediction of misinformation, real impact
on the future of the Web requires intervention. One way for poli-
cymakers to limit the spread of misinformation is to dictate global
rules and enforce them by removing false content and banning
users. But such harsh measures are controversial. Who adjudicates
what constitutes false content or who is a toxic user? The approach
outlined in the present paper sidesteps these questions: we show
that the local actions of individual users convey information re-
garding the veracity of the rumors with which they engage. Hence,
platform-wide outcomes might be shifted not by imposing a set of
top-down rules, but by incentivizing users to act individually in
ways that are shown to be globally helpful. Of course, determin-
ing how to guide users at the local level requires a strong causal
understanding of online information propagation, which is the ulti-
mate goal when studying the role of the Web in shaping our social
discourse.
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